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THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND

PUBLIC POLICY IN CANADA 0
BY PATRICK . MONAHAN* AND MARIE RNKELSTEIN*

Much of the literature on the Charter has focused on the manner in which the
courts have interpreted the document. This essay examines the Charter from
another perspective-its impact on the policy process within government.
Drawing on a series of papers prepared by senior government officials at both
the federal and provincial levels, the authors argue that the Charter has
permanently changed the way in which governments formulate and implement
public policy in Canada. Virtually all policy proposals making their way to the
Cabinet table must be examined to ensure that they conform to the
requirements of the Charter. This has forced governments to put in place new
procedures and structures to undertake this review. It has also changed the
balance of power within government, significantly enhancing the role and
authority of the Attorney General. The authors describe these important
structural changes and assess the degree to which they make a difference to
policy outcomes.
In 1982 we put an end to most legal positivism. Now that's a revolution. That's like
introducing the metric system. It is like Pasteur's discoveries ... [l]ike the invention of
penicillin, the laser. It was a great event.
1
Chief Justice Lamer
-
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I. INTRODUCTION
With Canada's Charter2 now a decade old, few will dispute the
fact that its enactment represents a fundamental watershed in Canadian
politics. Most commentators argue that the Charter has "truly
transformed the Canadian political landscape," 3 revolutionizing our
views on the nature of law and political debate. Whereas the pre-1982
Constitution focused on relations between governments, the Charterhas
created what Alan Cairns has termed a "citizen's constitution," one

2 CanadianCharter ofRights and Freedom, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
3 R. Knopff& F.L. Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1992) at 1.
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which focuses on group
identities that transcend or are indifferent to
4
provincial boundaries.
Yet, while there is broad agreement on the Charter's
significance, 5 there is little consensus on the precise nature of its
impact. 6 Moreover, there has been relatively little sustained attempt to
measure the impact of the Charter on the public policy process in
general. The analysis undertaken has tended to focus on the impact of
particular court decisions, 7 or on the Charter'srole in shaping particular
political controversies. 8 We know relatively little about the way in which
the Charterhas affected how governments go about their business on a
day-to-day basis. This is partly due to the secrecy surrounding the policymaking process in Canada. Canadians tend to know less about the inner
workings of their own government than do citizens in the United States
or the United Kingdom.9 Given the paucity of our knowledge about
Cabinet government in Canada, it is hardly surprising that we know
relatively little about the Charter'srole in the process.
This study attempts to trace the way in which the Charter has
affected the workings of government in Canada over the past decade.

4 A.C. Cairns, Disruptions:ConstitutionalStruggles,from the Charterto Meech Lake, ed. by D.E.
Williams (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1991) at 109.
5 It should be noted that individual Canadians are uncertain of the degree to which the Charter
has had any impact on their lives. Recent polling data indicates that, while 45 per cent of Canadians
believe that the Charter has "been a good thing for individual Canadians," 35 per cent believe that
the Charter hasn't made much of a difference, and a further 6 per cent are unsure of whether the
Charterhas had an impact. The Angus Reid Group, Public Release, "A Decade with the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (National Angus Reid/Southam News Poll) (11 April 1992 ) at
Table 1.
6 See, for example, the differing views on the impact and benefits of the Charterin M. Mandel,
The CharterofRights and the Legalization ofPolitics in Canada (Toronto: Thompson, 1989); and D.
Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian Production of ConstitutionalReview
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990).
7 See F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & M.J. Withey, "The Supreme Court's First One Hundred
Charter of Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall LJ. 1.
8 See Cairns, supra note 4 (analyzing the role of the Charter in the debate over the Meech
Lake debate).
9 See D. Smith, "The Federal Cabinet in Canadian Politics" in M.S. Whittington & G.
Williams, eds., CanadianPoliticsin the 1990s, 3d ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1990) 359
at 359, who notes that "studies of the Federal Cabinet are rare. There is no encyclopedic Canadian
work comparable to Sir Ivor Jenning's Cabinet Government in Great Britain, nor are there even
many less, ambitious exercises."
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Our analysis and conclusions are based on a series of papers prepared by
senior officials in governments across Canada. The authors of these
papers were asked to describe any new procedures or policy processes
that have been put in place in response to the Charter's o enactment.
The papers also deal with a wide variety of other issues, including'how
Charter considerations are applied in the policy process, how litigation
strategy is developed in the face of a court challenge to legislation, and
the Charter'simpact on law enforcement. The papers were presented
and debated at a two day Round-table Conference, attended by
government officials, politicians, private sector lawyers, academics and
journalists, convened by the Centre for Public Law and Public Policy in
November 1991.
The most important finding emerging from this study is that the
Charter has permanently changed the way in which policy proposals
make their way to the Cabinet table. Many governments have instituted
new procedures or bureaucratic structures designed explicitly to ensure
that the Charteris taken into account at the earliest stages of the policy
process. Even the smaller provincial governments, which have tended to
respond to the Charterin a less formalized manner, nevertheless believe
that the Charter's existence has changed the way policies are evaluated
and approved.
The senior government officials participating in this study
unanimously held that the Charter has affected more than just the
bureaucratic process. In their view, policy outcomes have been
significantly affected by the Charter'sexistence. While the Chartermight
initially have been greeted with some resistance or scepticism in
government circles, the senior officials participating in this study believe
that "Chartervalues" have now been deeply and permanently integrated
into the attitudes of government decision makers across the country.
This embrace of the Charter by government decision makers
appears to be, at least for some officials or departments, more a matter
of necessity than desire. The participants in our study reported that, at
least initially, the introduction of the Charterwas not accompanied by
any fundamental changes in the way in which governments formulated
policy. But as the courts, particularly the Supreme Court of Canada,

10 See Appendix A, which sets out the guidelines

for the preparation of the papers.
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evinced an intention to apply a "large and liberal"11 interpretation of the
Charter,governments were forced to respond. Certain court decisions
striking down legislation on the basis of the Charterwere described as
"bombshells" within government circles.1 2 Officials were forced to
scramble and assess the policy damage in the particular case and to put
in place new structures and procedures to ensure that similar difficulties
were avoided in the future.
For policy makers, the Charter represents a new element of
uncertainty in the policy mix. Whereas prior to 1982, the risk of
constitutional reversal in the courts was relatively limited, the enactment
of the Charterhas very substantially increased those risks. In general,
governments dislike uncertainty and, where reasonably possible, will
seek to minimize or reduce its impact on their calculations. But there
are two factors which make the uncertainty associated with the Charter
particularly difficult to manage. First, given the absence of authoritative
court rulings on many important Charterissues, it is extremely difficult to
make an accurate assessment of the risks of reversal by a court. Second,
a negative court decision may require expenditure of very substantial
amounts of money. Cases such as Singh v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration),13 R. v. Askov, 14 and R v. Schachter15 have
required additional government outlays of hundreds of millions of
dollars. Moreover, these additional outlays were contingencies which
were not factored into budgetary calculations made prior to the Court
decisions. In this period of restraint and retrenchment, which
governments across North America face, this type of after-the-fact fiscal
monkey-wrench is particularly difficult to accommodate.
The government has responded by attempting to reduce the
uncertainty associated with the Charteron an ex ante basis. A number of
governments now automatically require all policy proposals coming to
Cabinet to be subjected to Charterscrutiny at the earliest stages of the

11 M. Dawson, Associate Deputy Minister, Public Law, Department of Justice, Canada,
"Impact of the Charter on Public Policy and the Department of Justice" (Paper presented at the
Round-table Conference, York University, November 1991) also in this volume at 595.
12 Ibid.
13 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.

14 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 [hereinafterAskov].
15 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 [hereinafter Schachter].
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policy process.1 6 Under these early-warningsystems, Charter
considerations are supposedly factored into the analysis at the front end
of the process, rather than as a last minute add-on when a fullydeveloped policy proposal is about to reach the Cabinet table. This type
of scrutiny reduces, to the greatest extent possible, the likelihood that
the courts will intervene to redesign policy schemes in the absence of an
adequate understanding of the costs and implications of the available
alternatives.
In this study we argue that these new processes and new ways of
making policy make a difference to policy outcomes. But identifying the
precise nature of that difference-of how policy outcomes are altered in
light of the Charter-isby no means a simple or a straightforward
exercise. The participants in this study emphasized the fact that the
Charter'sinfluence on policy outcomes is a matter of degree. Instances
of the Chartertotally blocking governments from proceeding with
legislation or policy initiatives appear to be relatively rare. Instead, the
Charterexerts a kind of gravitational pull within the policy system,
altering the relative balance between the various options being
considered by government. According to participants in our study, the
Charterforces governments to redesign or to fine tune law or policy so as
to respond to Charterconcerns.
It is very difficult to offer any universal, all-encompassing
conclusions or to pinpoint or categorize in absolute terms the Charter's
impact since it is a matter of degree. The papers prepared for this study
further suggest that the significance of the Charterwill vary depending
upon the particular policy field that is under consideration.
Despite these caveats, we do believe that it is possible to say
something meaningful about how the Charterhas affected policy making
and the administration of law. This paper sets out the above
conclusions, pointing out the extent to which the policy process and the
policy outcomes it generates are different as a result of the Charter.
The first section of the paper provides an overview of the ways in
which senior government officials believe the Charter has changed how
they make policy or enforce laws. First, we describe a series of new
procedures or structures which have been created within the
governments of Canada, Ontario, Saskatchewan and British Columbia.
These new processes are described in some detail since many of them
16

The precise nature and extent of this review is described in detail below in Part II.
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are of relatively recent origin and have not, to our knowledge, been
discussed in the existing literature on the Charter. After describing these
institutional changes, we set out the perceptions of government officials
within each government as to how substantive policy outcomes are
different because of the Charter. Finally, we consider how these
governments respond to Charter challenges in the courts and the extent
to which litigation policy has been affected by the Charter.
The next section of the paper considers the views of a wide range
of observers from outside government on the Charter's impact on the
policy-making process. As part of this study, we included participation
by representatives of interest groups, academics, and the private bar.
We report their views of the ways in which governments have changed
(or, in some cases, refused to change) their behaviour and policies in
light of the Charter.
Finally, we offer a series of four conclusions regarding the
overall impact of the Charteron the public policy process. We observe
first that different governments have responded in different ways to the
Charter'sexistence. While some governments have put in place quite
elaborate and formalized systems for Charterscrutiny, others have
continued to rely on informal and ad hoc approaches. By putting in
place formal and regular structures for Charterscreening, governments
ensure that all relevant Charter issues are at least identified and
considered. This further ensures the most complete and careful analysis
of the implications of the Charterfor particular policy initiatives.
Second, we suggest that the Charterhas not substituted judges
for politicians as some critics of the Charterhad feared would happen.
Our findings indicate that the Charterrarely forecloses a government
policy or initiative. Rather, what the Charter does is alter the
environment in which political decisions are made. It has introduced an
important new variable into the political mix but has left a significant
element of discretion in the hands of political leaders. Key political
decisions are still being made by politicians rather than judges. Focusing
on two recent government initiatives, the amendments to the Criminal
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Code17 dealing with sexual assault18 and the referendum legislation,19 we
point out how Charter considerations interact with other political
variables.
Third, the Charter has altered the balance of power within
government itself, increasing the role and status of Attorneys General
and their legal advisers. In many governments, the Attorney General
has been constituted as a new central agency with a range of power and
influence rivalling only that of the Finance Department. A very large
part of this power is attributable to the monopoly which the Attorney
General enjoys over the provision of legal advice within government. Its
heightened influence is an important institutional change which has thus
far gone almost unnoticed in the literature on government and public
policy in Canada.
Finally, we suggest that the Charterhas had an important impact
on the nature of political debate and argument, and that these broader
political changes have themselves impacted on government policy
making. The Charter has introduced a new kind of valuable political
good or commodity into the political arena. This new political
commodity is the ability to make a credible claim that some right,
privilege or other entitlement is protected by the Charter. The ability to
advance these types of claims is linked to courts and the litigation
process. But claims about the Charterare also advanced in political
forums, with the object of securing changes in government policy
favourable to one's own interest. The ability to invoke the Charterin aid
of one's interests is an extremely powerful political tool. As such,
various groups and organizations are prepared to devote significant
energy and resources to the task of linking their interests with the
Charter. In the first decade of the Charter,certain sorts of groups or
organizations have had greater success than others in forging this link
with "Chartervalues". We trace some of the broader implications of this
new type of Charterpolitics for the future of public policy in Canada.
The early debates over the Charter focused on the legitimacy of
handing over power from elected politicians to unelected judges. We
17

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter CriminalCode].

18 Bill C-49, An Act to amend the CriminalCode (sexual assault), 3d Sess., 34th Parl., 1991 (1st
reading 12 December 1991) [hereinafter Bill C-49].
19 Bill (2-81, The Referendum Act, 3d Sess., 34th Par!., 1992 (1st reading 15 May 1992)
[hereinafter Bill C-81].
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suggest that the preoccupation with this legitimacy debate may have
deflected attention from some of the more fundamental changes which
have been brought about by the Charter. The papers prepared for this
study suggest that the increased role of the judiciary under the Charteris
of secondary importance. Far more significant is the way in which the
Charterhas changed political debate and the policy process itself. The
Charterhas not really reduced the role, responsibilities or power of our
politicians or the executive. Rather, it has altered how that political
power is exercised, providing new opportunities, incentives and
advantages for certain sorts of interests. As we enter the second decade
of the Charter era, identifying who has benefitted and who has lost from
these changes is what requires sustained and careful attention.
II. THE CHARTER AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE VIEW FROM
WITHIN GOVERNMENT
The senior government officials participating in this study were
unanimously of the view that the Charterhas had a major effect on policy
making. The consensus was that Chartercompliance has become one of
the most important factors in the policy-development process, with some
dissension only on the question of degree. Some participants went so far
as to suggest that Charter considerations may now equal or even
outweigh fiscal considerations 20
New processes and, in some cases, whole new bureaucracies have
been created in government to deal with Charterconcerns. The
particular changes which have been implemented by Canada, Ontario,
Saskatchewan and British Columbia are described in some detail below.
In general terms, it can be seen that the Charterhas tended to have a
centralizing effect within government. Initiatives in the line ministries
and departments of many governments are coming under review by
newly created Chartersections in their respective Justice/Attorney
General Departments. The purpose of this Charterreview is not only to
identify and assess Charterproblems, but also to maintain a coherent and
coordinated Charterpolicy on a government-wide basis.
What follows is a summary of the responses from officials in the
federal government, as well as in the provinces of Ontario, British
20

Supra note 11.
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Columbia and Saskatchewan respecting the Charter'simpact on their dayto-day work. As will be evident, these officials report that they have
embraced Chartervalues and have made an effort to ensure that their
policies can withstand Charterscrutiny. Later in the paper we will
subject these claims to a more critical analysis. This first section merely
records the perceptions of government officials as to the Charter's
impact on their activity.
A. FederalGovernment
1. Institutional change
Federal officials participating in this study stated that, from their
perspective, the Charterhas had an enormous impact on policy making.
The Minister of Justice has a statutory obligation to examine all
regulations and government bills for Charter consistency and to report
any inconsistencies to the House of Commons.2 1 The Department of
Justice has therefore created a series of new procedures for Charter
review.
First,a Human Rights Section has been established within the
Department of Justice as a centre for Charterexpertise for Justice
lawyers and their line ministry clients. The staff of this section has
grown to twenty-two lawyers with responsibility for research, policy
work, advisory services, and litigation support in matters relating to the
Charterand other human rights instruments 22
Second, within each department there are Justice lawyers
responsible for providing legal advice, including advice on any potential
Charterproblems. The Deputy Minister of Justice has reportedly been
urging client departments for some time to consult their legal advisers at
an early stage to identify Charterand other legal issues before policy

21

Department ofJustice Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-2, s. 4; and the Statutory Instruments Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. S-22, s. 3, as amended by the Statute Law (Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms)
AmendmentAc R.S.C. 1985 (1st Supp.), c. 31, ss. 93-94.
22

Supra note 11.
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options are fixedP3 In the words of one Justice lawyer, the Schachte24
case was a "bombshell" in Ottawa and provided a powerful lesson on the
necessity of teamwork among policy makers and lawyers in the policy
development process.25
Justice lawyers on staff in the client departments are directly
involved in identifying Charter issues during the policy development
process. They now have, and consult, materials prepared by the Human
Rights Section. Human Rights Section lawyers are also called in to
provide assistance and to advise on alternative policy solutions.
Additional problems may ultimately be spotted by the Legislation
Section of the Justice Department and sent back either to the legal
services unit in the originating ministry or to the Human Rights Section
in Justice. 26
Third, in 1991, the Clerk of the Privy Council, Paul Tellier, wrote
to all deputy ministers outlining steps to ensure that Charter issues are
identified and assessed before new policy proposals are submitted to
Cabinet. Mr. Tellier specifically asked the deputy ministers to consult
their legal advisers early in the process so that a Charter analysis,
assessing the risk of successful court challenge, the impact of an adverse
decision, and the possible costs of litigation, could be included in the
27
material going to Cabinet.
Two aspects of these new procedures bear emphasis. First, it is
significant that concern over Charter compliance is no longer simply a
matter being raised by the Department of Justice. Mr. Tellier's
intervention indicates the seriousness and the visibility of Charter
concerns within the highest reaches of the federal bureaucracy.
Secondly, the current emphasis within the federal government is on

23 Ibid.
24

Supra note 15. At trial it was held that the appropriate remedy was not to strike down the

provision, which provided benefits to adoptive parents under the Unemployment InsuranceAct,
1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, as being contrary to section 15(1), the "equality" provision, of the
Charter but to extend it to natural parents: [1988] 3 F.C. 515 (T.D.).
25

Supra note 11.
261Ibid.
27

Ibid. See also, M. Zazulak, General Counsel, Correctional Services Canada, "Charter of
Rights and Freedoms: A Correctional Service of Canada Perspective" (Paper prepared for the
Round-table Conference, York University, November 1991) at 4-7 [unpublished]. See p. 499, note
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identifying Charter concerns at the earliest stages of the policy
development process. It is evident that waiting to raise Charterconcerns
until a full-blown policy proposal reaches the Cabinet table makes it
much more difficult to accommodate those concerns.
Justice lawyers at the Conference felt that the most serious
Charterissues are resolved, at least in the sense of being considered and
having a position taken on, before they reach Cabinet. If there is still a
dispute outstanding, the Minister of Justice may be invited to express his
or her views to the appropriate Cabinet committee. 28
2. Substantive policy making
To what extent does this effort to take into account Charter
concerns lead to changes in policy or in law enforcement practices within
the federal government? Within the Department of Justice, the view is
that the Charter has had a very significant impact on both policy
formulation and the administration of law.
Federal Justice lawyers see the Department of Justice as a
central agency. 29 Whereas formerly their advice was sought on an ad
hoc and issue-specific basis, today the Charter has meant that they are
involved on a continuous and regular basis in the work of all
departments. The range and degree of their influence may not yet rival
the Department of Finance, but they are involved in the mainstream of
decision making to a previously unheard of degree.30 Justice lawyers do
not see their role as involving the exercise of a veto over proposals or
projects of other departments. Rather, they see themselves as working
cooperatively with other ministries to overcome Charterroadblocks and
to devise viable alternatives. Once a scheme has been implemented and
struck down, it is difficult at that stage to develop workable programs
which will pass constitutional muster.31
28

Supra note 11.

29

Ibid.

3

IN

31

The trial decision in Schachter,supra note 24, was affirmed at the Federal Court of Appeal:

[1990] 2 F.C. 129. This put budgetary Charterpressure on the government when trying to develop
new policy options in this area. The Schachter decision in turn has caused the Federal government
to review the Income TaxAct, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, for Charterconformity in order to avoid litigation
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Justice lawyers argue that they take a broad reading of court
rulings on the Charter. They believe that government is under an
obligation to try to live up to the spirit, and not just the letter, of the
Charter. In some cases this produces conflict with line departments,
which might adopt a somewhat narrower interpretation of a court ruling
on a particular issue.
For example, there is uncertainty about how Supreme Court of
Canada decisions like R. v. Sparrow,32 a case which deals with Aboriginal
affairs, should be interpreted. Legal opinions from the Justice
Department have advised a broad and liberal interpretation. Line
ministries, like the Departments of Fisheries, Indian Affairs, and the
Environment, which are directly affected in their routine functions,
apparently feel that a narrower approach is appropriate until further
clarification is received. 33
Federal enforcement agencies, such as Corrections and the
RCMP, claim .that they adopt an expansive approach to the Charter.
According to Corrections Canada, Charterconsiderations are of
fundamental importance to policy development. They indicate that they
endeavour to identify potential Charterissues, sometimes even before
seeking Charteradvice. Corrections tries to minimize the risk of a
successful court challenge by reading Charterdecisions broadly34 and
considers itself as having incorporated Chartervalues and norms within
its service philosophy.
and its resulting uncertainties. It also has resulted in changes to unemployment insurance

provisions: Unemployment InsuranceAc4 R.S.C. 1985, c. U-1. s. 20, as am. by S.C. 1990, c. 40, s. 14.
32 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.

33 M. Krasnick, Secretary, Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat, Address (Oral remarks at the
Round-table Conference, York University, November 1991) [unpublished]. See p. 499, note 1.
34 See Zazulak, supra note 27 at 5-6. One example of where the Charterhas influenced
Corrections policy is in the search and seizure regulations relating to inmates: see Weatherall v.

Canada (A.G.), [1989] 1 F.C. 18 (C.A.).

In Bill C-36, An Act Regarding Corrections and the

ConditionalRelease and detention of offenders and to establish the office of CorrectionalInvestigator,

3d Sess., 34th Parl., 1991-1992 (assented to 14 May 1992); the Service has attempted, through the
introduction of objective preconditions, to balance the security needed for inmate searches with the
section 8 Charterprohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, Corrections
will, as a matter of litigation policy, initially defend policies in operation from Charterchallenge.
When a significant provision is declared of no force and effect under the Charter,a range of
responses will be considered, including a proposal to amend the offending provision to remedy the
Charter deficiency or the issuing of a policy directive either as an interim response pending

amendment or as a solution in itself. The latter option, however, carries a greater risk; section 1 of
the Charter will not be available as a defence of such a limitation because it would not be
"prescribed by law."
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The RCMP reports that its law enforcement operations have been
significantly affected by the Charter. In fact, the RCMP'S senior legal
adviser suggests that the force has been the "hardest hit" of any
department or agency within the federal government by the enactment
of the Charter.35 After Hunterv. Southam Inc.,36 for example, officers
must be better prepared and have more information before attempting a
search or seizure. It is anticipated that legal advice will increasingly be
sought with respect to the limitations on a proposed operation in light of
sections 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) and 10 (right to counsel) of
the Charter. Indeed, Crown attorneys are becoming involved early on in
complicated investigations in order to avoid Charterinfringements. The
R. v. Wong3 7 case made clear that video surveillance is not permitted
except in the clearest situations where there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy, since there is no provision in the Criminal Code for a warrant
in respect of video surveillance. Similarly, R. v. Duarte38 has, for most
practical purposes, effectively eliminated electronic surveillance in the
absence of a judicial authorization.
The RCMP argues that it has adopted a "proactive" response to
the Charterand has attempted to integrate Chartervalues into its
operations in a systematic way.3 9 It has undertaken initiatives in
response to equality, multiculturalism and Aboriginal concerns which go
beyond the strict requirements of court decisions.4O The force has
35 C.F. Beckton, Director of Legal Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "Charter of
Rights and Freedoms: An Agency Perspective" (Paper prepared for the Round-table Conference,

York University, November 1991) [unpublished]. See liage 499, note 1.
36 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 [hereinafter Southam].

37 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36.
38 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30.
39

Beckton, supra note 35.
40 For example, since 1988, the RCMP's policy is not to discriminate in the hiring of
homosexual officers: see Beckton, supra note 35. Beckton reports that, with respect to Aboriginal

policing, the policy today has been changed from policing for, to policing in consort with, Aboriginal
peoples. The force is seeking to hire more Native constables, using educational programs to attract
them to the force, and to assist Aboriginals in establishing their own police forces. Similarly, the
RCMP is actively recruiting visible minorities, francophones, and women in an effort to respond to
the needs of the multicultural Canadian community. Special training has been instituted to assist
RCMP officers to understand the special needs of these communities. According to Beckton,
"cross-cultural" training is given to all recruits now at the training academy. A program has been

established to assist Aboriginals to attain the necessary qualifications to become regular members of
the force. The RCMP also plays an active role in the management of the Police Race Relations
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conducted, and continues to conduct, reviews of its legislation and
regulations, such as those pertaining to mandatory retirement, 41 for
Chartervalidity.
In summary, the federal government perceives the Charter as
currently playing a very significant role in terms of policy development
and law enforcement. The Charterdoes not operate to "veto" or block
governments from undertaking policy initiatives or administering laws.
Rather, it forces government to redesign its policies or programmes to
respond to Charterconcerns. Federal government lawyers argue that
they adopt a broad, rather than a narrow, reading of the Charter to
reduce the risks of a subsequent adverse court ruling. They believe their
advice on Charterissues is heeded and, where a Charter issue is
identified, steps are taken to ensure that those concerns are addressed.
3. Litigation policy
In addition to affecting policy development and law enforcement
activities, the Charterhas caused two important changes to be made in
the way the federal government approaches constitutional litigation.
First,Justice consults much more widely within government, going well
beyond the client ministry involved in the particular litigation because
frequently other departments are also interested in both the outcome
and the position to be advanced. Second, Justice officials no longer
automatically defend, using all available arguments, legislation which is
attacked on Charter grounds. They scrutinize the legislation, the
government's position and recent developments in Charter jurisprudence
to decide whether particular arguments should even be put forward or,
in extreme cases, whether the legislation should be defended at all. 42
Justice has established two separate committees, the Litigation
and CharterCommittees, to review proposed legal arguments for
consistency and conformity with general governmental policy. 43 The
Centre established at the Canadian Police College in Ottawa and has established an Advisory
Committee on Visible Minorities.
41

]bid. Beckton's paper states that, prior to the proclamation of section 15 of the Charter,the

RCMP changed its retirement policy from one which required different ranks to retire at different

ages to one which instituted a uniform retirement age of sixty for all members.
42 Dawson, supra note 11. See Part II, Saskatchewan Government, below for discussion.
43

Dawson, supra note 11.
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existence of these committees ensures that there is a regular process of
review, rather than reliance on an ad hoc system of advice and analysis.
The goal is to ensure that the position the department takes in a
particular case reflects a reasoned and defensible view of the
government's Charterobligations.
4. Summary
There has obviously been a very significant impact on the formal
policy structures within the federal government as a result of the Charter.
New bureaucratic branches or committees have been established with an
explicit mandate to ensure that all policy initiatives are reviewed for
Charterconcerns. Moreover, the perception of lawyers within the
federal government is that they take a "large and liberal" 44 approach to
Charteranalysis, rather than a narrow or technical one. It is also
significant that the Clerk of the Privy Council has issued instructions
requiring all policy initiatives to be scrutinized for Charter problems.
This further suggests that the federal government is attempting to
reduce the risk of adverse court rulings under the Charterto the greatest
extent possible.
B. Ontario Government
1. Institutional change
The pattern in Ontario is similar in many respects to that which
has developed at the federal level. In the mid-1980s, the Ontario
Government initiated a review of all existing legislation to introduce an
omnibus bill that would bring Ontario statutes in conformity with the
Charter.45 But this exercise, while complicated, was also circumscribed;
the process was undertaken on the understanding that amendments
would not deal with matters over which there was any legitimate legal or
policy dispute. This limitation was apparently agreed to because there
441Ibid.
45 See The Honourable Ian Scott, "The Charter and Public Policy" (Paper prepared for the
Round-table Conference, York University, November 1991) [unpublished]. See p. 499, note 1.
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was resistance in certain ministries or agencies to the Chartercompliance exercise. 46 The exercise culminated in the enactment of the
Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act 4 7 in 1986, which amended a
wide variety of Ontario statutes to bring them into conformity with the
Charter.
This Charter-compliance exercise was merely the first step in
Ontario's response to the Charter. In 1986, the government determined
that all policy submissions should automatically be reviewed for Charter
concerns prior to their coming to Cabinet. The standard-form Cabinet
submission document was changed so that it would be clearly indicated
on the cover page whether or not there were any outstanding Charter
concerns.48

This heightened attention to the Chartercreated additional
demands for Charter advice within the government. In 1987, the
Ministry of the Attorney General created a new Constitutional Law and
Policy Division under an Assistant Deputy Attorney General. The
establishment of the division, with a staff of approximately twenty
lawyers, allowed the Ontario Government to centralize constitutional
and Charterpolicy decision making from a government-wide perspective.
The mandate of the division was to provide a central "clearing house"
for all Charter concerns, whether in relation to policy initiatives or
litigation. 49
The government also provided for an expanded role for the
Ministry of the Attorney General in the early stages of the policy
development process. The government initiated a new policy whereby
Attorney General staff would be given regular briefings on policy
proposals which were being formulated in other ministries. This
represented a departure from established practice. Historically, policy
submissions were only shared with other ministries and ministers after
46 Ibid.

47 S.O. 1986, c. 64.
48 Scott, supra note 45.
49

Prior to that, legal advice was provided to government ministries largely by their own legal

staff, on secondment from the Attorney General's Office, or by the Head Office of the Attorney
General. The relationship of the Attorney General's legal staff to the individual ministries was
primarily one of solicitor-client. In litigation matters, legal advice and services were geared toward
winning cases. According to Ian Scott, ibid., the result was an ad hoc response to Charterissues
which hampered the development of a coherent and cohesive government Charterpolicy.
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they had passed through a complicated bureaucratic and ministerial
committee system and were ready to proceed to full Cabinet. Prior to
the final stage in the process, the full Cabinet discussion, policy
submissions were shared with other ministries and ministers only on a
"need-to-know" basis. Under this established system, the Attorney
General did not have systematic access to economic or social policy until
very shortly before it reached the Cabinet table when, as a practical
matter, it was too late to make significant changes.
Since 1986, however, the Attorney General's staff has had to be
briefed on all developing issues, at least when they enter the formal
policy approval process. This permits the Attorney General or a
member of the staff to appear in Cabinet committees or bureaucratic
committees of which the individual was not ordinarily a member and
raise questions about possible Charterimplications.50
As in the federal government, the goal in Ontario is to address
Charterissues as early in the policy process as possible. Usually, ministry
policy staff consider the Charter'simpact on their Cabinet proposals and
consult lawyers in their own ministry on secondment from the Attorney
General's office. Ontario has attempted to bring together lawyers and
policy makers at the earliest possible stage in the hope of counteracting
unproductive rivalries and misunderstandings about their perceived
roles. Previously, there was a sense that some policy makers resented
what they regarded as interference by Attorney General legal advisers.
The lawyers were sometimes perceived as lacking knowledge of the
policy concerns at stake. Early interaction is intended to further mutual
understanding and to underscore the lawyers' role in protecting policy
objectives from judicial attack on constitutional grounds.5 1
Today, before a matter can proceed to Cabinet, the responsible
minister must certify that there are no outstanding Charter concerns.
Any concerns which do arise are to be resolved through discussions with
the ministry legal counsel and/or lawyers in the Constitutional Law and
Policy Division of the Attorney General. If Charterconcerns arise after
a policy submission has entered the formal approval process, the Cabinet
Office refers them back to the originating ministry and to the

50 Ibid. at 5-7. Scott notes that the success of this process must depend on an assertive
minister who is "prepared to minimize his political role."
51

Ibid. at 6 and at 7.
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Constitutional Law and Policy Section. The Attorney General may also
raise Charterconcerns in Cabinet.
At the next stage, when the policy proposal has received Cabinet
approval and is ready to be translated into legislation, the Legislative
Council lawyers look at possible Charterrisks for drafting purposes.5 2
Finally, the Legislation and Regulations Committees in the Legislative
Assembly scrutinize the legislation for Charterconflicts prior to its being
introduced in the House.
2. Substantive policy making
Ontario officials participating in this study were of the view that
the Charterhas played a very significant role in the policy process. Like
the federal Department of Justice, the Ontario Attorney General's
Department has become very much a central agency wielding significant
influence within the policy process. But, Attorney General lawyers
regard themselves as partners with officials in the line ministries, rather
than as roadblocks standing in the way of policy proposals. They
recognize that, when working with policy makers in the line ministries,
they have to learn to understand the policy goals at issue in any proposal
and to find means to further those goals without violating Charter
principles.
At the Round-table Conference, the Executive Coordinator of
the Cabinet committee on Justice from the Ontario Cabinet Office
identified a number of major, but not exclusive, areas in which the
Charterhas had an impact on policy making:5 3
1. Perhaps the most obvious impact comes when the government
loses a Chartercase and is required to implement major policy or
administrative changes as soon as possible. For example, the
Ontario Attorney General's Department had to respond to the
Askov 5 4 decision quickly, by speeding up the trial process,
altering its resource allocation priorities, changing the court
52 1 Jai, Executive Co-ordinator, Cabinet Committee on Justice, Cabinet Office, Ontario,
Address (Oral remarks at the Round-table Conference, York University, November 1991)
[unpublished].
53

Ibid.

54

Supra note 14.
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system and the relationship between Crown and defence
attorneys, and requiring earlier disclosure by them.
2. Even where the government wins a Chartercase, the risk of loss
usually acts as an incentive for it to rethink the issue and the
consequences of defeat on a future challenge. For example,
although the government successfully defended the Retail
Business HolidaysAct 55 on two separate occasions, the perceived
vulnerability of the legislation to court challenge, coupled with
other factors such as the economic weakness of the retail sector,
caused the government to make amendments to the legislation s6
3. The government may use the Charterto challenge the legislation
of other governments. In a hypothetical example, the Ontario
Attorney General could invoke the Charter to challenge the
constitutionality of the federal abortion bill. 5 7 This strategy is
not exclusive to the Charter,of course, and was used in the early
1970s when Manitoba challenged Quebec's restrictive marketing
board practices by referring the Quebec scheme, thinly disguised,
to the Manitoba Court of Appeal and on to the Supreme Court
of Canada to test its validity.58
4. The possibility of a Charterchallenge is often the rationale for
prioritizing government action in a particular area, bumping a
matter that would otherwise simmer on the back burner to the
top of the policy initiative list.
With respect to the impact of the Charter on the day-to-day
development of policy, there tended to be some dichotomy between the
views of Attorney General lawyers and those of officials in other
ministries or agencies. While lawyers in the Ministry of the Attorney
General view Charter concerns as being in the forefront of policy
development, policy makers in central agencies like the Cabinet Office

55

R.S.O. 1990, c. R.30.
See R. v. Edwards Books andArt Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713; and R. v. PaulMadger FursLtd.
(1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 172, where the Retail Business Holidays Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 453, was
successfully challenged following which theAct was amended: An Act to amend the Retail Business
HolidaysAct, S.O. 1989, c. 3.
57
Bill C-220, An Act to amend the CriminalCode (abortion),3d Sess., 34th Pan., (1st reading 3
June 1991).
56

58

Manitoba (A.G.) v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Association (The Manitoba Egg Reference)
(1971), 18 D.LR. (3d) 326 (Man. CA.), aff"d [1971] S.C.R. 689.
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and the line ministries consider the Charterto be only one factor in the
process. Further, while Attorney General lawyers tend to suggest that a
broad interpretation be given to Charter requirements, line ministry

officials often favour a narrower reading of the relevant Charter
provision.
The Charteralso appears to have had a significant impact on
certain agencies, boards and commissions in the Ontario Public Service.
One example of this impact is provided by the Ontario Human Rights
Commission. Pursuant to the Ontario Human Rights Code,5 9 the
Commission is both an investigative and prosecutorial body. After
investigating a complaint, the Commission decides whether to refer the
matter to the Human Rights Tribunal before which the Commission will

then prosecute the complaint.
In its investigative mode, the Commission is particularly
concerned with procedural challenges on the issue of delay under section
7 of the Charterand restrictions upon its search and seizure powers
pursuant to section 8.60 In its prosecutorial mode, the Commission sees
59

OntarioHuman Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19 [hereinafter Human Rights Code].
60 See R. Devins, Commissioner, Ontario Human Rights Commission, "A Perspective from
the Ontario Human Rights Commission" (Paper prepared for the Round-table Conference, York
University, November 1991) [unpublished]. See p. 499, note 1.
For example, in cases involving allegations of sexual harassment, the courts in Saskatchewan
have held that unreasonable delay can deprive a respondent of the right to "life, liberty and security
of the person" under section 7. The stigma that attaches to an individual accused of sexual
harassment has clearly influenced the court. The Saskatchewan Commission has instituted a policy
of priority-handling for sexual harassment cases to avoid further challenges on the ground of delay.
Although there have not yet been any cases in Ontario in which a section 7 delay argument has been
successfully raised, the Human Rights Commission is clearly mindful of this issue when it
deliberates and, with the aid of government funding, has moved to eliminate its backlog and
minimize delay.
The restrictions imposed by section 8 of the Charteron the obtaining of search warrants have
also been of concern. Following Southan, supra note 36, any application for a search warrant must
be specific and identify the documents being sought with a significant degree of particularity. This

creates real difficulties for the Commission in investigating broad-based complaints of systemic
discrimination, since there is not likely to be a single or even a series of incidents which can be
proven upon production of predetermined documents. Rather, it is typical that a general pattern or
practice is alleged to be discriminatory. Moreover, individual complainants are typically aware only
of the facts pertaining to their own circumstances. Complaints of systemic discrimination require an
investigator to go on site and analyze the records available in a wide-ranging fashion to determine
the scope of systemic barriers. In the absence of an "inside" informant or witness who can direct
the Commission to specific files or documents, the Commission feels that it will be almost
impossible for the solicitors drafting the warrant application to compose sufficiently specific
requests for documents. Unless the courts allow greater latitude in this area, the Commission's view
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its work as particularly closely linked with the Charter. Many of the core
values that underlie the Human Rights Code such as protection of
individual rights and pursuit of equality, are similar to those that inform
the Charter. The Commission interprets section 28 of the Human Rights
Code as charging it to ensure that the Code is consistent with the Charter,
in particular the equality provisions under section 15.61 Consequently,
the Commission staff have reviewed the Human Rights Code and are in
the process of preparing submissions, setting out their analysis of
perceived infringements, to present to the responsible minister. The
Commission has questioned the validity of parts of its own enabling
legislation in the context of a complaint, even in the face of a defence by
the Attorney General. 62
3. Litigation policy
The Ontario Government has moved to ensure that the positions
advanced in particular Chartercases are consistent and reflect a coherent
approach to the interpretation of the Charter. The Constitutional Law
and Policy Division within the Ministry of the Attorney General is
responsible for vetting the legal arguments advanced by the government
in Charter cases. The government does not automatically defend all
impugned legislation. For example, the government agreed in Re
Blainey and the OntarioHockey Association63 that the exemption in the
Human Rights Code, as it existed then, which permitted the exclusion of
girls from minor league hockey was a violation of the Charter. However,
concessions of this kind are relatively infrequent, and the far more

is that its ability to initiate and investigate complaints of industry-wide discriminatory practices will
be impeded in cases where there is no complainant with sufficient details who is willing to come
forward.
61 Section 28 of the Human Rights Code provides for the formation of a race relations division
to perform functions relating to race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, or creed that
are referred to it by the Commission.
62 See Devins, supra note 60 at 5-8. At least on one occasion, the Commission has sent a case
to the Board of Inquiry taking the position that certain sections of the Code are inconsistent with
section 15 of the Charterand are not reasonable limits on that right under section 1.
63 (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.). In this case, the Human Rights Code, S.O. 1981, c. 53, s. 19,
was successfully challenged.
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common practice is to attempt to defend legislation once it has been
challenged.
In fact,' the government will often prefer to wait for a court
challenge before instituting a policy change in the case of a politically
controversial issue. The government recently defended and lost a case
involving election laws which prevented inmates from voting
provincially. 64 Even though there was a prior awareness that this
restriction may violate the Charter,the matter was not on the
government's list of priorities. One may query, of course, why the
restriction was defended at all under those circumstances.
4. Summary
The pattern in Ontario is similar in many respects to that
observed in the federal government. The emphasis has been on putting
in place new formalized structures or procedures to ensure that Charter
issues are addressed as early in the policy process as possible. The
premise of this approach is that most Charter concerns can be
accommodated in a manner which still permits the government to
achieve its policy objectives. Because all Cabinet submissions must be
certified as being in compliance with the Charter,the Attorney General
appears to have assumed the status of a central agency within the
government as a whole.
C. Saskatchewan Government
1. Institutional change
The Government of Saskatchewan comprises a much smaller,
more centralized bureaucracy than Ontario or the federal government. 65
All Crown lawyers work within the Department of Justice and are not
formally attached to line ministries or departments. Within Justice,

64 See Jai, supra note 52.
65 G. Mitchell, Assistant Director of Constitutional Law, Department of Justice,
Saskatchewan, Address (Oral remarks at the Round-table Conference, York University, November
1991) [unpublished]. See p. 499, note 1.

524

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 30 No. 3

however, certain solicitors are responsible for providing legal advice and
assistance to these ministries.
The sole adviser to the Saskatchewan Government on Charter
issues is the Constitutional Branch of the Justice Department. It will,
when requested, offer legal advice at all stages of the policy development
and legislative drafting processes. The branch is also responsible for
conducting and coordinating Charter litigation that involves the
provincial government. This centralized role is thought to ensure
consistent advice on Charterpolicy. 66
Perhaps as a consequence of the smaller, more centralized
nature of the Saskatchewan bureaucracy, its process of Charterreview is
more ad hoc and informal than that in Ontario or Canada. In those
larger governments, structures and specific procedures have been
implemented to ensure, insofar as possible, that Justice plays a major
role at the earliest stages of the process. In Saskatchewan, the onus
appears to be on the line ministry to seek Charteradvice; no bureaucratic
structure or procedure is in place to require consultation in the same
kind of systematic way.
The ministry lawyer may be asked to review what are, at a given
stage, general policy proposals. Any Charter issues which the solicitor
identifies will usually be referred to the Constitutional Branch for
assessment and a legal opinion. The branch's involvement at this early
point in the policy development process operates to educate both
departmental officials about the Charter and the legal people about the
societal, section 1 values at stake.
At the formal or drafting stage of legislation, Charter advice is
requisite. Once a proposal for legislation is approved by Cabinet or the
Legislative Review Committee, drafting instructions are prepared by the
responsible department or agency. These instructions are then
forwarded to the appropriate Crown solicitor for his or her
consideration. Even if the drafting instructions are not referred to the
Constitutional Branch at this point, the Legislative Drafting Section

66

Ibid. at 3-4.
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it is returned to the
forwards all draft legislation to the branch before
67
Legislative Review Committee for final approval.
2. Substantive policy making
According to the representative from the Constitutional Branch,
proposed legislative initiatives are now measured against the Charter
before they are finalized. s However, this type of approach, in which
Charterconcerns are not addressed until late in the policy development
process, will make it more difficult to accommodate those concerns. The
experience in both Ontario and the federal government indicates the
importance of raising Charterissues at the earliest possible stage in the
process. Precisely because Saskatchewan has not instituted such an earlywarning system to regularly raise Charterissues, the Charter'simpact on
the policy development process may be more limited.
When legislation is actually found by a court to be of no force
and effect, the Constitutional Branch of the Justice Department in
Saskatchewan will work to find constitutionally acceptable alternatives to
the invalidated legislative scheme with representatives from the relevant
government ministries. 6 9 In rare cases, where the Saskatchewan
Government determines that the importance of a legislative scheme
from a social and/or economic policy perspective outweighs any and all
constitutional considerations, it will invoke section 33 of the Charter.

67

Mitchell, ibid., claims that the legislative drafters and committee members are deferential to

the branch's recommendations for amendment on constitutional grounds. Such recommendations

for amendment are based on what the branch perceives as the broad or liberal approach taken by
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Charter matters.
68 Ibid. at 2. The Charter has been responsible for several sweeping legislative amendments.

Shortly after the proclamation of the Charter, the entire body of Saskatchewan legislation was
reviewed at the direction of the Attorney General to identify laws which were inconsistent with the
Charter on their face. This resulted in an omnibus bill legislating appropriate amendments, the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ConsequentialAmendment Act, S.S. 1984-85-86, c. 38. In
other areas, efforts have been made to craft a standard search and seizure provision for general use
in provincial administrative and regulatory schemes such as occupational health and safety, workers'
compensation, and environmental standards: see The Oil and Gas ConservationAmendment Act,
1991, S.S. 1990-91, c. 39, s. 6. The Constitutional Branch has been assisting legislative drafters with

this task, refining the provision as the section 8 jurisprudence has evolved.
69 See supra note 60 at 7.
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The Government of Saskatchewan exercised thisfinal option in 1986 to
end a walk-out by the Saskatchewan Government Employees' Union. 70
3. Litigation policy
Due to its much smaller scale government, all of the
Saskatchewan Government's Charterlitigation is undertaken or
supervised by a relatively small group of lawyers in the Constitutional
Branch. Thus, there has been no need for the creation of new
committees or constitutional divisions, such as are found in Canada or
Ontario, to review legal arguments in Chartercases.
The Constitutional Branch's general approach is to defend, if
possible, the impugned statutes. The branch's view is that, as counsel for
the government, it should not waive the application of a law just because
of the possibility of a judicial ruling against it. As well, in its view, the
Attorney General must represent the interests of society before the
courts, just as the applicant represents the interests of the individual.
Therefore, only in a case where there is no reasonably plausible
argument in favour of legislation will the branch advise a governmental
department to forego defending its policy in court and amend it to
satisfy Charterrequirements.
4. Summary
The pattern in Saskatchewan is quite different from that
encountered at the federal level or, at the provincial level, in Ontario.
Saskatchewan has not created any new formal procedures or structures
in order to explicitly address Charterconcerns. In large part, this
appears to be the result of the smaller scale government in
Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan takes the view that all legislation should
be defended from Charterchallenge. It considers it the Attorney
General's responsibility to defend legislation from any constitutional
challenge.

70 See The SEGUDisputeSettlementAct, S.S. 1984-85-86, c. 111. Also see Mitchell, supra note
65 at 7.
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D. British Columbia Government
1. Institutional change
The Ministry of the Attorney General of British Columbia is
divided into a number of branches, including Criminal Justice and Legal
Services, which in turn is subdivided into Solicitor, Barrister, and
Legislative Counsel Divisions. The Ministry solicitors generally are
responsible for providing day-to-day legal advice to their client
ministries. Within the Barrister Division, there is a section which
specializes in administrative and constitutional law. 71
There is a newly redesigned legislative approval process in place
whereby policy initiatives are examined for Charterproblems. As with
Saskatchewan, it is far less formal than in either Canada or Ontario.
When the House Leader issues a call for legislative proposals
from the line ministries, the internal departments that consider policy,
planning, and legislation coordinate and prioritize those requests. If the
line ministry's solicitor is involved at the early stages of the request for
legislation, the policy is reviewed for Charterproblems at that time,
although in ministries like Health there are no formal written guidelines
for Charterissues to be considered at that point. 72 After the requests for
legislation have been considered, either by the Deputy Ministers'
Committee, various Cabinet committees, Cabinet as a whole, or the
Treasury Board, where funding approval is required; Cabinet sets the
legislative priorities and the policy initiatives are sent to be drafted. 73 At
that stage, a Cabinet Directive requires that Charter issues be
considered. Once in the hands of the Legislative Counsel's office for

71 S. Gallagher, Solicitor, Ministry of the Attorney General for British Columbia, "Impact of
the Charter on the Public Policy Process" (Paper prepared for the Round-table Conference, York
University, November 1991) at 1 [unpublished]. See p. 499, note 1.
72 This is in contrast to the procedure in Ottawa where policy makers are required to seek
legal advice early in the process, and in Ontario where legal counsel work with policy makers to
develop policy as a matter of routine practice.
73 In some ministries, like Health, the initial rough drafting and instructions for drafting are
prepared by members of the Policy, Planning and Legislation Department together with legal
counsel, who presumably will attempt to identify and resolve any Charter issues that arise. This
department will then pass instructions to legislative counsel for final drafting and preparation of the
bill.
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drafting, the counsel assigned to the task flags any Charter issues and
refers them to the Ministry of the Attorney General's Constitutional and
Administrative Law Section.
The proposed legislation, now in bill form, is then sent to the
Cabinet committee on legislation, where it is reviewed by a senior policy
analyst in the Premier's office with a special eye to identifying Charter
problems. The analyst may also refer any concerns back to the Ministry
of the Attorney General and, in particular, request further opinions
from the Constitutional and Administrative Law Section. 74
After all the prerequisites are met, the bill is taken to Cabinet for
final approval. Once it is approved, the Minister briefs caucus before
the bill is introduced into the Legislature.
Regulations and orders in council, which are often prepared
within the sponsoring line ministry, are signed by a number of ministry
officials, including legal counsel. The scrutiny afforded by these
methods of policy implementation varies depending upon the underlying
policy and sponsoring line ministry. 75
2. Litigation policy
In the face of a Charter challenge, the Justice Department and
line ministries which review the matter, are reportedly amenable to
making changes to take account of Charterconcerns. This is more likely
to be the case where the provision in question was enacted prior to the
Charter,and therefore prior to the Charterscrutiny that routinely takes

74 See Gallagher, supra note 71 at 3.
75 In the Ministry of Health, for example, the level of scrutiny of orders in counsel and
regulations is relatively high in accordance with an informal procedure that has developed
internally. The Conference was advised that this scrutiny is required by the same Cabinet Directive
that requires scrutiny of legislative enactments. Furthermore, section 2 of the Regulations
Regulation, made under the Regulations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 361.1, as rep. by RegulationsAct,
R.S.B.C. 1983, c. 10, s. 18, requires that the regulation-making authority be advised whether the
proposed regulation is authorized by the enactment under which it is made; is an unusual or
unexpected use of that authority; trespasses unduly on existing rights and freedoms; is consistent
with the Charter; and is drafted in accordance with the standards set by the Chief Legislative
Counsel.
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place today. New legislation that has been conceived and drafted with
the Charterin mind is likely be defended by the Attorney General. 76
3. Summary
The British Columbia approach more closely resembles the one
in Saskatchewan than that in either Canada or Ontario. There is no
formalized procedure or process to consider the Charter concerns at the
initial stages of the policy process. Charter issues are required to be
addressed only after a policy proposal has received Cabinet's initial
approval and has reached the drafting stage. As noted earlier, there is
less flexibility at this stage in the process, making it more difficult to
modify policy proposals to respond to the Charter.
III. THE CHARTER AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE VIEW FROM
OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT
It is evident that government officials believe themselves to be
very responsive to Charterconcerns. But to what extent is this
perception shared by those outside of government, particularly
individuals or interest groups who see the Charteras a central concern?
In an attempt to answer this question, this study included
participation by representatives of interest groups, academics, and
representatives of the private bar. As might be expected, these
participants from outside government took a much less favourable view
of government's response to the Charter. Significantly, however, the
objections raised were by no means uniform or even consistent with each
other. In certain cases, it was said that the government was not taking
the Charterseriously enough and that it needed to take a broader view of
76 If the attack is on the wording or interpretation of a regulation or policy, for example, the
line ministry will be alerted as a matter of practice before the writ or petition is served. If the
ministry solicitor advises that the wording or interpretation offends the Charter, the ministry will

often make the necessary modifications. Where the attack is on the government's interpretation or
application of a statutory provision, again the ministry, if forewarned, may simply modify its
interpretation. If, however, the attack is on the provision itself and the Legislature is not in session,
it will not be possible to change the impugned provision even if the government agrees that it is
unconstitutional. In some cases, the action may be adjourned until the Legislature has had the

opportunity to change the offending provision.
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the nature of its Charterobligations. But in other instances, precisely the
opposite objection was raised. In this second category of cases, it was
argued that the government had taken an overly broad view of the
Charterand that this inhibited it from proceeding with meritorious policy
initiatives.
Consider, for example, the views expressed by a representative 77
of the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund. 78 Groups like LEAF
see themselves as performing a dual role. First, they bring Charter
challenges against government legislation or policies. In this context,
they complain primarily that the government's decision to defend
legislation or policies is largely automatic and not based on policy
considerations or even the merits of the case. They see little evidence of
the decision to defend being reconsidered, or this type of litigation being
a trigger for policy review. They also complain that there is no sense of
special governmental responsibility for fostering and promoting Charter
rights. Rather, according to them, the government treats Charter
litigation like any other, without any discernable attempt to spare the
purses of special interest groups by voluntary disclosures, fewer
discoveries, avoidance of procedural technicalities, or consolidation of
issues. Private practitioners who participated at the Round-table
Conference and who regularly litigate constitutional cases against the
government, shared the view that the government uses the same tactics
that it uses in any other litigation; it bankrupts the opposition before the
case gets to trial.
But LEAF does not see the Chartersimply as a means to challenge
or restrict government action. LEAF, and other "equality-seeking groups"
believe that government has been given a Charter-imposedresponsibility
to promote equality proactively. 79 This responsibility includes an
77 See E. Shilton, "Charter Litigation and the Policy Processes of Government: A Public

Interest Perspective" (Paper prepared for the Round-table Conference, York University, November
1991) also in this volume.
78 Hereinafter LEAF.

79 Groups like LEAF feel that, after Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927

[hereinafter Irwin Toy], and R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [hereinafter Keegstra]; there is a

positive role for legislatures in the promotion of equality. In Irwin Toy, the Supreme Court of
Canada said that it will take a more flexible approach in the balancing of rights and interests under
section 1 of the Charter. It would do this where interests other than those of the state are being

protected and promoted by the legislation under attack, and will, in particular, allow the
government more scope to balance the claims of competing groups where the rights of vulnerable

1992]

CharterandPublic Policy

531

obligation to defend "equality promoting" legislation when that
legislation is challenged. They also believe that when such legislation is
ruled unconstitutional, there is an obligation to draft new legislation
which will advance equality goals.
In the view of LEAF and other equality-seeking groups,
governments in Canada have failed to discharge adequately the positive
obligations associated with the Charter.s ° The federal government in
particular is criticized for being too timid in defending legislation under
Charterattack. The government is also regarded as being too reluctant
to bring forward new legislation to replace laws ruled unconstitutional by
81
the courts.
A somewhat different perspective was offered by a number of
private lawyers who were not connected with these equality-seeking
interest groups. The focus of the criticism from these private
practitioners was that government litigation strategy is not well
formulated. The decision to defend is viewed as a "knee-jerk" reaction
to the institution of proceedings, or as a means to avoid spending the
required monies, or to avoid finding a political solution to a
groups are at stake. The Court said in Keegstra that legislation designed to promote and enhance
equality rights is entitled to special protection under section I in light of the Charter's commitment
to equality and the reflection of that commitment in section 1. LEAF has interpreted these decisions
to mean that there must, therefore, be a high premium placed on proper legislative drafting,
creation of legislative history, which leaves no room for doubt about legislative intent to promote
equality, and proper litigation strategies to defend the legislation against attack. LEAF's perception
is that these have been missing. If government lawyers are, as suspected by LEAF, vetoing policies
that run a Charter risk, LEAF would argue that the advice of outside counsel should be sought
because, after cases like R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 [hereinafter Seaboyer], some Charter
risks should be taken.
80 LEAF's perception is that the government has consistently shown a lack of sensitivity to
equality values. Whatever section 1 evidence is marshalled in support of government policy, it
includes very little that is tailored to support a possible section 15 argument. It has been largely up
to LEAF, in LEAF's opinion, to make the section 15 case in, for example, Irwin Toy, Keegstra, and
Seaboyer. supra note 79.
81 It should be noted that this perception is not necessarily universally shared by the "equalityseeking" movement. For example, the perception of those connected with the Disability Rights
Movement, according to the Advocacy Resource Centre for the Handicapped (ARCH)
representative at the Conference, is that the Charter has been useful in effecting social change.
When the Charter was enacted, ARCH sought the inclusion of the handicapped as part of a strategy
of law reform. Since then, the Disability Rights Movement has relied on litigation as a strategy over
and above law reform. The disabled and the Aboriginal people have also found that Charter
litigation is a successful tool for increasing public visibility and an awareness of their rights thereby
increasing the pressure on government to respond to their needs. See A. Nikias, Advocacy
Resource Centre for the Handicapped, Address (Oral remarks at the Round-table Conference,
York University, November 1991) [unpublished].
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controversial problem. This is so even where there is an obvious Charter
infringement. One example cited pertains to religion in public schools.
Even after the Ontario Court of Appeal had struck down the regulations
of the Sudbury School Board providing for prayer in the public schools
in Zylberberg v. Directorof Education of Sudbury Board of Education,8 2
the government defended, with section 1 evidence, a similar type of
regulation providing for religious education in Elgin County. The
regulation was again struck down. Even then, however, the Minister of
Education failed to provide directions on the matter to the Board of
Trustees in Sault St. Marie who had elected to continue with Christian
indoctrination in the schools. Only when faced with another Charter
challenge did the trustees change their position. 83
In sum, those directly involved in dealings with government in
relation to the Charter appear to be dissatisfied with the response they
have received. However, the criticisms that are raised are inconsistent
with each other. In some cases, the government is criticized for not
taking the Charterseriously enough and for defending legislation which

ought to be abandoned. In other cases, the government is criticized for
conceding defeat too easily or for not defending legislation from Charter
attack with sufficient vigour.
In our view, evidence suggests that the government has indeed
been taking the Charterseriously and attempting to respond to its
requirements. We do not suggest that any particular decision, either to
defend or not to defend legislation, is correct. We merely observe that
the government is clearly thinking hard about the Charterand making an
effort in good faith to respond to it in an appropriate manner.
82 (1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Ont. C.A.).
83 See L. Taman, former Assistant Deputy Attorney General for Constitutional Law and
Policy for Ontario, "The Charter and Public Policy" (Paper presented at the Round-table
Conference, York University, November 1991) [unpublished]. See p. 499, note 1. Mr. Taman, now
a private practitioner, made a number of points in this regard. First, he noted that government
lawyers do not have one client. They serve a multi-headed hydra with non-communicating heads,
each one with very different policy interests at stake. This makes it difficult to reach a uniform
policy position on any given case that would facilitate a settlement. In other cases, the government
has simply been unable to come to terms with rights seekers on initiatives to amend or replace
existing legislation. The result is that, in cases where the government has successfully defended the
existing law, the proposed amendments drop off the government's priority list. Finally, litigation
often proceeds because both sides want a judicial decision on an issue. Government may want to
avoid the political heat that comes with a controversial decision by leaving the problem to the
courts. Special interest groups often want a precedent-setting decision.
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This conclusion was supported by the observations of a number
of other participants in this study who are not directly involved in
Charterlitigation. Professor Morton theorized that Charter advocacy
groups have succeeded in achieving significant political power, enabling
them to influence a number of other players in the policy-making
process. Morton sees the state itself as intertwined with equality-seeking
groups. He uses the term "Court Party" to describe the coalition of
Charter-basedgroups, due to the public funding provided for their
operating budgets, the availability of courts, and human rights
commissions as forums for the pursuit of their interests and the8 4
institution of bureaucratic processes for Charter review of policy.
Morton includes in the above list the public funding of universities
tend to
alleging that they 'are the seat of constitutional activists who
85
groups.
equality-seeking
of
agenda
policy
sympathize with the
In Morton's view, Charter-basedgroups have actively sought to
advance their interests by circumventing the electoral-legislative process
and working their agenda through the courts. In his view, they believe
that federally appointed judges will provide a more sympathetic hearing
than the elected representatives of the voting majority who are opposed
to paying more taxes to finance social reform. Consequently, he sees
these groups, as another form of
constitutional litigation, 8 for
6
amendment.
constitutional
Obviously, these varying perspectives from outside of
government on the Charter'srole and impact are inconsistent and even
contradictory with one another. But considered as a whole, they tend to
confirm the perceptions that government officials have offered
concerning how the Charterhas affected public policy and law
enforcement. Government officials reported that the Charterhas had a
significant impact on how governments go about their business in the
1990s, on the formulation of government policy, and on the
administration of law. Whole new structures or procedures have been
put in place in some governments to respond to Charterconcerns. The
84 F.L. Morton, "The Charter Revolution and the Court Party" (Paper prepared for the

Round-table Conference, York University, November 1991) also in this volume at 627.
85 Morton in his paper, ibid., postulates that the Charter scholarship emanating from these

institutions has contributed greatly to the revolution of the Supreme Court of Canada from
pre-Charterrestraint to post-Charteractivism.
86
Ibid.
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views of those outside government tend to confirm the validity of these
observations from those inside government. Even those who complain
that governments are failing to take the Charterseriously enough object
to the fact that, in certain cases, the government has been too timid in
defending its legislation from Charterattack.
In our view, there can be little doubt that the Charter has
transformed the nature of the policy process. The more difficult
question, however, pertains to the precise nature of the Charter'simpact
on government law making and law enforcement. It is to this issue that
we now turn.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
We observed at the outset that it is difficult to offer any hard and
fast generalizations about the Charter'simpact on public policy and law
enforcement. Despite this caveat, we believe it is possible to offer four
general conclusions about how the Charterhas affected the day-to-day
workings of government in Canada.
A. No Uniform GovernmentResponse to CharterAnalysis
The first conclusion to emerge from this study is hardly
surprising, but bears repeating: different governments have responded
in different ways to the Charter'senactment. Within certain
governments, particularly Canada and Ontario, new procedures or
bureaucratic structures have been created to deal explicitly with Charter
issues. The goal of these new procedures is to attempt to raise Charter
issues and concerns as early in the process as possible. There has also
been an attempt in both the federal and Ontario governments to ensure
a consistent, coherent approach to Charterissues government-wide.
Other governments have not yet instituted such formalized
approaches to their Charteranalyses. In both Saskatchewan and British
Columbia, we noted that there is no procedure that guarantees that
Charterissues are addressed at the policy formulation stage. Whether
the Charteris raised as an issue at this early stage in the process depends
on the particular individuals or ministries involved.

1992]

CharterandPublic Policy

One expects the Charterto have its greatest impact on policy
making in governments that have instituted more rigorous and
formalized procedures for Charterreview. This is because these types of
formal procedures will bring a greater number of Charterissues to the
attention of policy makers. They will also provide a more complete
record and analysis of the relevant Charterconcerns relating to a
particular policy proposal.
While this hypothesis is intuitively appealing, how one might go
about testing its validity in a systematic fashion is not self-evident. One
possibility would be to compare the results in Chartercases involving
different provinces with those provinces' approach to Charter analysis.
Earlier studies have already pointed out wide variations in the results of
Chartercases involving different provinces. But these variations may
have more to do with the attitudes of the judges who sit on the different
Courts of Appeal. As a result of an activist Court of Appeal, the Crown
success rate in Charter
in Saskatchewan has tended to have a lower
87
appeals than the Crowns in other provinces.
We believe that this subject represents an important area for
future research. One hypothesis is that the Charterwill have its greatest
impact within governments that have instituted formalized "earlywarning" systems for Charter issues. But our data on the response of
different governments to the Charterare incomplete. What is needed is
more complete information on the ways in which governments have
changed their policy processes in order to deal with the Charter. With
this type of data, it will be possible to test our hypothesis in a more
systematic fashion.
B. CharterNarrowsDiscretion
A major focus of debate at the time of the Charter's enactment
related to the legitimacy of judicial review. Critics of an entrenched
Charter argued that it was inappropriate for unelected judges to
substitute their views for those of elected political leaders.

87

For example, Morton, Russell & Withey, supra note 7, point out that the Crown has won

83% of the 168 reported Charterdecisions in the B.C. Court of Appeal; 73% of the 223 reported

decisions in the Ontario Court of Appeal; and only 63% of the 85 decisions in the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal. The average for all Courts of Appeal is a 76% success rate for the Crown.
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This study provides a new and different perspective on this
continuing legitimacy debate. The consensus view amongst government
policy makers is that the Charter does not operate as a veto on
government initiatives or proposals. Rather, the officials participating in
this study reported that the Charteradds a new variable to thepolicy mix.
This new policy variable is the risk that the courts will intervene and rule
that a particular initiative violates the Charter. But the introduction of
this new policy variable does not appear to prevent the government from
advancing its policy initiatives. It simply alters the calculations the
government must make in drafting its legislation.
To be sure, the Charterdoes represent an important new variable
in the policy process. Governments have made important changes to the
way in which legislation proceeds through the Cabinet process to ensure
that Charterconsiderations are highlighted and properly analyzed. This
response has been motivated as much by necessity as by virtue. When a
court strikes down legislation, the government is forced to respond, with
very little notice, in an ad hoc fashion. A policy response may well be
required within hours of the court ruling. It is clear that governments
wish to avoid being placed in this type of reactive mode. For this reason,
they will attempt to reduce the risks of an adverse Charterruling by
redrafting their legislation in advance so that it will be better able to
withstand Charterscrutiny.
The risk of an adverse Charterruling is not the only factor which
the government will take into account when framing its legislation. The
Charteris merely one in a wide range of variables, which a government
will take into account in deciding how to frame legislation. In this sense,
the Charterhas not removed decisions from the hands of legislators and
government officials and handed these decisions over to judges. Rather,
it has altered the environment in which government decisions must be
made.
Moreover, the assessment as to whether a particular government
measure violates the Charter (and, therefore, must be redrafted) is as
much a political analysis as it is a legal one. As an illustration, consider
the different government responses reflected in two recent pieces of
legislation-Bill C-49, the sexual assault amendments, and Bill C-81, the
referendum legislation. In both instances, arguments were raised as to
possible Charterviolations. What is striking is that in one case Charter
considerations were given precedence, while in the other they were
discounted. Part of the explanation for the different government
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responses in these two cases is, no doubt, linked to the particular Charter
arguments that were raised. But in our view, the different approaches
taken towards the Charterin these instances are as much a product of
larger political considerations as they are of technical legal arguments.
In this sense, the Chartercan be seen as introducing a new political
variable into the hands of politicians and bureaucrats, which can be used
to advance political goals.
The first reading version of Bill C-49 provides that an accused
must take "all reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the
accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting."88
It thus proposes to alter the defences available to an accused charged
with sexual assault. This provision will make it possible to convict an
accused of sexual assault in circumstances where an accused person
honestly, but mistakenly, believes that the complainant consented.
Critics of the legislation have argued that this attempt to import a
"reasonableness" standard into the definition of the offence raises a
Charterissue.89 But the government evidently came to the conclusion, at
the first reading stage, that the risk was not so significant as to preclude
this approach.
Contrast this with the government's approach to the Charter in
Bill C-81. Here, the government argued that it was constitutionally
precluded from imposing spending limits in a national referendum
campaign. The main obstacle to spending limits appeared to be the
guarantees of free speech and free association in section 2 of the
Charter. According to the government, these Charterrights made it
impossible to require that a referendum be fought between a single
"Yes" committee and a single "No" committee. The inability to provide
for two umbrella committees made the imposition of spending limits
impracticable. 90
88 See section 273.2(b) of Bill C-49, supra note 18.
89 See G. York, "Lawyers wary of proposed rape law:

Commons committee told new

standards are contrary to centuries of accepted behaviour" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (15 May
1992) A6. But note the amendments introduced by the government at the committee stage on 2
June 1992 were designed to reduce the risk of a Charter challenge. In particular, the government
proposed to delete the word "all" in section 273.2(b), supra note 18, requiring the accused to take
only "reasonable" steps to ascertain that the complainant was consenting.
90 See G. Fraser, "Fear of Court case prompts looser law" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (16

May 1992) A5. Note that the government introduced amendments on second reading limiting
referendum expenditures, but without limiting the number of campaign committees. As such, the
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In both cases, serious Charterarguments were at issue. In the
case of Bill C-81, the Charterarguments were taken as decisive, at least
on the issue of spending limits. In Bill C-49, on the other hand, the
Charterconcerns were seen as being less significant than the interest in
protecting complainants in cases of sexual assault. What do these
examples tell us about the way in which the Charteris likely to influence
the policy process?
The first point to note is that whether Charter arguments are
accepted or not depends to some extent on who is arguing in their
favour. Bill C-49 was drafted through what the government terms a
"democratic, consultative process" 91 in which government officials met
with representatives of various interest groups. Representatives of these
interest groups argued that the government was under an obligation to
bring forward some kind of protection for sexual assault complainants in
the wake of the Seaboyer92 case. Having agreed to this consultative
process, it would have been very difficult for the government to back
away subsequently and refuse to introduce some kind of new protection
for complainants and victims, even though there were some Charterrisks
involved. The preamble to Bill C-49 reflects this approach, noting that
"the Parliament of Canada wishes to encourage the reporting of
incidents of sexual violence or abuse. '9 3 However, once the legislation
was introduced, there was widespread criticism of certain provisions in it
by the Canadian Bar Association and other legal groups. In the face of
this sustained criticism, the government's legal opinion apparently

amendments do not constitute any real limit on overall expenditures by any particular group or
interest.
91 See The Honourable Kim Campbell, "Notes for An Address on the Canadian Charter of

Rights and Freedoms" (Address at the Conference on the Charter of Rights: Ten Years After,
Simon Fraser University, 15 May 1992) at 21. According to media reports, the Bill was drafted after

the Justice Minister held a series of meetings with a coalition of women's groups. See "Lawyers win
concessions from Ottawa on rape bill" The Toronto Star (3 June 1992) A3.
92

Supra note 79. In this case a blanket exclusion of a complainant's prior sexual history under

section 276 of the Criminal Code was ruled unconstitutional by the Court as violating the accused's

rights under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.
93 See Bill C-49, supra note 18. This philosophy is reflected in the substantive terms of the
Bill, which provides that courts shall consider "society's interest in encouraging the reporting of
sexual assault offenses" in determining whether to allow evidence of a complainant's previous sexual
history. See proposed section 276(3)(b).
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changed with the Minister agreeing to a number of changes designed to
strengthen protections for the accused. 94
In the case of the Bill C-81, no powerful political constituency
argued in favour of spending limits. The most vocal proponents of
referendum spending limits are Quebec sovereignists, who argue that
spending limits are necessary to prevent the better-financed federalist
side from simply drowning out the voices in favour of Quebec
sovereignty. But because Quebec sovereignists have no political voice
outside of the province of Quebec, there was no major political price
associated with omitting these spending limits. It is surely no
coincidence that in the case of Bill C-81, the Charterarguments based on
free speech and free association proved decisive.
A second important consideration in the case of the referendum
legislation was the very tight time frame facing the government. With
the province of Quebec scheduled to hold a referendum by 26 October
1992, the Government of Canada wanted to be in a position to hold a
national referendum on short notice prior to that date. Had the
government introduced spending limits into the legislation, it would
almost certainly have provoked a Charter challenge. This litigation
might not have been finally resolved prior to the October deadline.
Indeed, the only way the government could have obtained a definitive
court ruling in a timely fashion would have been to refer the matter
directly to the Supreme Court of Canada for an expedited hearing. But
referring the issue directly to the Supreme Court would have had
important drawbacks. Regardless of the outcome, the government
would have been forced to postpone any referendum until after the
Court had spoken. This would have significantly narrowed the window
of opportunity for a national referendum and might have foreclosed the
possibility of a national vote prior to 26 October 1992.9 5 What this
illustrates is that it is often the fear of Charterlitigation itself, rather than
outcome of the litigation, which pushes the government in a particular
direction.
Thus, the government's decision to defer to Charter
considerations in one case but not in the other was only partly due to the

94 See C. Gaz. 1992.111.991. for the latest version of Bill C-49.
95 Note that under the legislation the referendum campaign must last at least 36 days. This
would mean that any Charter litigation had to be finally resolved by 19 September 1992 in order for
a referendum to be held by 26 October 1992.
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legal merits of the arguments raised. Other political factors also played
a decisive role in the eventual decision of whether to frame the
legislation so as to minimize the risk of an adverse court ruling.
The upshot of this analysis is that the Charterhas not substituted
judges for politicians, as some critics of the Charterfeared would
happen. Thus, many of the early concerns regarding the legitimacy of
judicial review under the Charter may well have been overblown. It is
evident that politicians and bureaucrats remain the primary political
decision makers, even in the Charterera. Further, while the executive
must take the Charter into account in its decisions, constitutional
considerations rarely operate as legal handcuffs; there is still a large
element of discretion and policy choice that remains in the hands of the
government. Ultimately, the decision to defer to a Charter argument
and redraft legislation is not simply a technical legal matter. It depends
on a wide variety of extra-legal considerations, including such matters as
the political support for, and timing of, the initiative.
In this sense, the Charter has changed the way government
operates, providing new opportunities, advantages, and costs that must
be taken into account in the policy process. But, it has not produced
government by judiciary or relocated the locus of political decision
making in Canada.
C. Charterand Balance of Power Within Government
A clear effect of the Charter'senactment has been an increase in
the status, visibility, and political power of lawyers and legal values
within government. As the participants in our study emphasized, the
Minister of Justice/Attorney General has acquired a new status and
importance in the Charter era. Increasingly, the Attorney General is
coming to be regarded as a central agency of the government, with a
range of influence rivalling that of the Minister of Finance. This is
particularly the case in the governments of Canada and Ontario, where
all policy proposals are regularly scrutinized by Justice lawyers at the
earliest stages of the policy process to ensure conformity with Charter
values.
There are two reasons why this kind of Charterscrutiny is likely
to increase dramatically the political power of lawyers within
government. The first has to do with the high degree of indeterminacy
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associated with any assessment of the likely impact of the Charteron a
policy proposal. Charterjurisprudence is still in its infancy and the
Supreme Court of Canada has only begun to sketch in very broad terms
its approach to Charteranalysis. In many policy areas, there may not
even be any jurisprudence from that Court directly on point. Thus, the
assessment of whether or not a particular policy proposal violates the
Chartermay often involve a very large element of guesswork.
Both of the examples, referred to earlier, illustrate the high
degree of indeterminacy involved in assessing a possible Charter
violation. In the case of Bill C-81, the only Canadian case law dealing
with the constitutionality of spending limits under the Charteris a 1984
decision from the trial division of the Alberta Supreme Court.96 Despite
the sparseness of the case law, federal officials declared in definitive
terms that spending limits in a referendum campaign would violate the
Charter.9 7 With respect to the sexual assault amendments, the
government initially took the position that the proposals did not violate
the Charter. Subsequently, the government reversed its course and
introduced amendments designed to protect Charterrights.
Second, due to the indeterminacy associated with assessing the
risk of a Charterviolation, it will be very difficult for government lawyers
to avoid colouring their legal analysis with their views of the substantive
merits of legislation. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the
Attorney General is the sole official source of legal analysis within
government. Ministers of the Crown are not permitted to seek opinions
from outside government on the constitutional merits of a policy
proposal that is working its way through the Cabinet system. The
Attorney General has a monopoly on the provision of legal opinions
within the government. Thus the degree of indeterminacy and subjective
evaluation associated with any particular legal opinion may not be
highlighted until after the key policy choices have been made.
Politicians with no legal training will not be in a position to question
effectively the Charteradvice they receive from the Attorney General.
The combined effect of these various factors is to increase in
quite a dramatic fashion the role, status, and power of the Attorney
General and its officials. Cast in the role of a central agency, the
Attorney General has the ability and the resources to affect the shape of
96

NationalCitizens CoalitionInc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1984] 5 W.W.R. 436 (Alta Q.B.).
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See statements made by Government House Leader Harvie Andr6 in Fraser, supra note 90.
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policy proposals from all branches of the government. The
indeterminacy of the legal judgments that must be made, combined with
the legal monopoly enjoyed by the Attorney General's advisers, suggest
that there has been an important shift in the balance of power within
government.
D. Charterand the Policy Environment Within Government
The primary focus of this study has been on the internal
workings of the policy process within different governments in Canada.
But it is clear that this focus on the internal operations of government
provides an incomplete picture of the Charter'simpact on public policy.
As was suggested in the previous paragraphs, the Charter'simpact has
been as much political as legal. The Charterhas altered the political
environment within which governments operate.
This change in the political environment is, of course, linked to
Charterlitigation and to the legal consequences that flow from a
declaration that a particular law or policy violates the Charter. The
Charterhas also introduced a new kind of valuable political good or
commodity into political argument and debate. This new political
commodity is the ability t6 make a credible claim that some right,
privilege, or other entitlement is protected by the Charter.
The most authoritative way to establish a credible claim of this
kind is through a court declaration. But it is important to recognize that
a credible claim that some right, privilege, or entitlement is protected by
the Charter does not necessarily depend upon a court order. A court
ruling, while authoritative, is expensive. Further, many issues may never
reach the courts for resolution. In any event, Charterclaims are made
for purely political, as well as legal, objectives. They are advanced in
political forums as well as courts, with the objective of shaping public
policy in one's favour. Success in the political arena is far less expensive
and time consuming since it makes court action to vindicate one's
interest unnecessary.
Of course, the simple act of claiming that one's interest is
protected by the Charteris not sufficient; one must be able to invoke
some credible source or authority in support of one's claim. There are a
variety of ways in which this credibility can be established. Perhaps one
of the most important means is by an organization, which has received
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some sort of official sanction or recognition supporting the claim.
Organizations that fall into this category include Human Rights
Commissions and organizations, independent Law Reform
Commissions, university-based organizations, judicial bodies, and the
associations of the organized bar. The Court Challenges Program,
cancelled in the 1992 federal budget, also provided a form of official
sanction and recognition. Indeed, the credibility and recognition the
program conferred on funding recipients may well have bedn as
important as the funding itself.
A full discussion of the way in which the Charterhas affected the
political process as a whole is beyond the scope of this study.
Nevertheless, we offer here a few general and preliminary observations
on this important issue. First, claims about the Charterare inherently
technical arguments. Even when advanced in a political forum, they
require legal expertise and authority. This, in turn, suggests that it will
be organized interests, which have the resources to retain this legal
expertise, that stand to gain a comparative political advantage from the
Charter'sexistence. Established interests, such as governments, large
corporations, and trade unions are obviously well positioned to take
advantage of this opportunity and have done so in the first decade of the
Charter. But the enactment of the Charterhas been the catalyst for the
creation of a whole series of new organizations, most of them linked in
some way with the enumerated grounds in section 15 of the Charter. As
the paper prepared by Professor Morton indicates, these "equalityseeking groups" have been very successful in linking their interests to the
Charter.98
A second observation is that the ability to link one's own
interests with the Charter is an extremely valuable political commodity.
It produces political results. In the case of Bill C-49, for example,
lobbying by various legal organizations, such as the Canadian Bar
Association, succeeded in persuading the government to amend the
legislation so as to provide greater protection for the accused.9 9 Because
of the political potency of Charter arguments, there is a tremendous
incentive to try to shape perceptions of the Charter'smeaning so as to
advance one's political goals.

98

Morton, supra note 84.

99

See "Lawyers win concessions from Ottawa on rape bill," supra note 91.
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This political struggle over the meaning of the Charteris ongoing
and ceaseless. But thus far, "minority groups," as well as persons
accused of crimes, have come to be linked in the public mind with the
Charter.100 It is possible that there is a double-edged quality to this
perception. On the one hand, having one's interests tied to the Charter
can provide positive political results. At the same time, the drawback is
that the public will come to regard the Charter as somehow linked to
particular interests, rather than those of the community as a whole.1 °1
As the Charterenters its second decade, these political dimensions of the
Charter debate will prove as interesting and important as the
pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Canada on the legal meaning
of the document.

100 See supra note 5 at 12 (Table 4), which found that "minority groups" and persons accused
of crimes are seen by the public as being the greatest beneficiaries of the Charter. No definition was
offered of the term "minority groups," but 66% of respondents believed that the Charterhad had a
positive impact on these groups, while only 13% believed that there had been a negative impact. An
additional 13% believed that the Charterhad had no impact on minority groups. This compared to
40% who believed that "Canadians like you" had benefitted from the Charter,with 39% indicating
that the Charterhad had no impact on them and 15% perceiving a negative impact.
101 Note that in April 1992, those Canadians who believed that the Charterhad been a good
thing outnumbered those who saw it as a bad thing by a 3 to 1 margin. Supra note 5.
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Charterand Public Policy

APPENDIX A:
GUIDELINES FOR PREPARATION OF SHORT PAPERS
I. GENERAL
1. In your experience, has the Charter had a significant impact on the
policy process of government? What has been the nature of that
impact?
2. Has the Charteroperated as a significant constraint on legislative
supremacy? Has the existence of the Charterforeclosed certain sorts of
policy options or made those options significantly more costly or difficult
to pursue?
3. Has the Charter'simpact been more significant in particular policy
fields than others? Which policy fields have been more significantly
impacted? Are there identifiable reasons for this differential impact?
4. It has been argued that the Charter was intended to have a
nationalisingimpact as the differences between individual provincial
legislation would be reduced or minimised. In your experience, has this
been a consequence of the Charter?
II. PROCESS
1. Is there a standard procedure within the normal policy process which
requires that Charterissues be considered? To what extent are Charterrelated issues a regular feature of the policy process within your
government?
2. In your experience, is it common for proposed legislation to be
amended as a result of Charter-related considerations?
3. Once it has been determined that a particular piece of legislation
raises Charterissues, how is the matter dealt with and resolved? In
particular:
a) Are there any procedures that have been established that set out
a method for resolving Charter issues?
b) What is the role of the Attorney General/Minister of Justice in
relation to the line Ministry?
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c) At what stage in the policy process is the matter referred to
Justice for constitutional advice?
d) Whose advice and opinion is taken as conclusive?
III. CHARTER POLICY
1. Does the government tend to apply judicial decisions in a broad
fashion at the policy-making stage or do policy makers apply them
narrowly until the policy is actually tested in court?
2. How are costs or other policy considerations balanced against Charter
rights? Is it generally accepted that policies should be framed in a
manner that is least intrusive of individual rights?
IV. CHARTER LITIGATION
1. When a statute is challenged, is it automatically defended or are there
circumstances where the government is prepared to concede the
invalidity of the statute? In what circumstances and in what manner
might this occur?
2. In the event that a statute is ruled unconstitutional, to what extent
will the government seek to maintainthe policy goal of the invalid
legislation, through the use of some alternative mechanism or policy
instrument?

